The Dogger Bank Case (The International Commission of Inquiry between Great Britain and Russia arising out of the North Sea Incident)

Facts

In October 1904, during the Russo-Japanese war, the Admiral of the Russian Baltic fleet, then coming off the coast of Norway, received rumors from several sources of the presence of Japanese torpedo boats in the vicinity, and on this account the fleet set sail for the Far East twenty-four hours ahead of schedule. As the last division of the fleet, in immediate charge of the Admiral, was passing through the North Sea in the early hours of the morning of 9 October 1904, it came upon what afterwards proved to be an English fishing fleet from Hull, England. The Russians, under a misapprehension that the English vessels were the Japanese torpedo boats, opened fire, with the result that one fishing boat was sunk and others damaged, while two fishermen were killed and six injured.

In order to prevent serious results from this incident, France suggested resort to an international commission of inquiry, as provided for in the Convention for the pacific settlement of international disputes, adopted by the Hague Conference of 1899. The suggestion was accepted by Great Britain and Russia, and an agreement was signed on 25 November 1904 which invested a commission composed of admirals from the British, Russian, United States, French and Austrian navies with authority to find the facts in dispute and to fix responsibility.

Questions Submitted to the Commission

1. To elucidate by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation the questions of fact connected with the incident that occurred in the North Sea on the night of 8-9 October 1904.
2. To determine the responsibility and the degree of blame attaching to the two States involved, or, if applicable, to subjects of other States.

Report of the Commission

The Commissioners concluded that on October 7, 1904 the second Russian squadron of the Pacific fleet, under the command-in-chief of Vice-Admiral aide-de-camp General Rojdestvensky, had anchored off Cape Skagen, for the purpose of coaling before continuing its voyage to the Far East.

From the depositions made, it appeared that, from the time of the departure of the squadron from the roadstead of Réval, Admiral Rojdestvensky had had the vessels under his charge take minute precautions in order to be fully prepared for a night attack by torpedo boats, either at sea or at anchor. The Commission found these precautions to have been justified by the numerous reports of the agents of the Imperial Government regarding possible hostile attacks, which in all likelihood would take the form of torpedo boat attacks. Moreover, during his stay at Skagen, Admiral Rojdestvensky had been warned of the presence of suspect vessels off the coast of Norway. He had heard that the commander of the transport Bakan, coming from the north, had seen four torpedo boats the previous night, carrying a single light only at the masthead.

This news made the Admiral decide to start twenty-four hours earlier. Consequently, each of the six distinct divisions of the fleet had gotten under way, separately and in turn, and reached the North Sea independently. The last division, formed by the four new battleships Prince Souvoroff', Emperor Alexander III, Borodino, Orel and the transport Anadyr, left Skagen on October 7 at 10:00 p.m.

Between 1:30 and 4:15 on the afternoon of the next day, October 8, all the divisions of the squadron passed the English steamer Zero. The last vessel to pass the Zero was the Kamchatka. This transport, which had originally been in a division with the Dmitri Donskoi and the Aurora, had been left behind and isolated about ten miles to the rear of the squadron. She had been obliged to slacken speed because of damage to her engines. The Commission concluded that this accidental delay was an incidental cause of the ensuing events.

Toward 8:00 p.m., the Kamchatka met the Swedish vessel Aldebaran and other unknown vessels and opened fire on them. At 8:45 p.m the commander of the Kamchatka sent a wireless message to his commander-in-chief, stating that he was being attacked on all sides by torpedo boats. The Commission noted that this may have caused Admiral Rojdestvensky to form the opinion, whether or not correct, that the attacking torpedo boats might overtake and attack him by about 1:00 a.m. This led Admiral Rojdestvensky to signal to his ships at about 10:00 p.m. to redouble their vigilance and look out for an attack by torpedo boats. On board all the ships, the Admiral's standing orders to the officer of the watch were to open fire in the event of an evident and imminent attack by torpedo boats.

The majority of the Commissioners found that these orders were in no way excessive in time of war, and particularly in the circumstances, which Admiral Rojdestvensky had every reason to consider very alarming, seeing that it was impossible for him to verify the accuracy of the warnings that he had received from the agents of his Government.

Toward 1:00 a.m. on October 9, 1904, the night was rather dark, a slight, low fog partly clouding the air. The moon showed only intermittently between the clouds. A moderate wind blew from the southeast, raising a long 

swell, which gave the ships a roll of 5° on each side. The course followed by the squadron toward the southwest would take the last two divisions, as the event proved, close past the Dogger Bank, the usual fishing ground of the fleet of Hull trawlers consisting of some thirty of small steamboats and over an area of several miles.

It appeared from the concordant testimony of the British witnesses that all these boats carried their proper lights, and were trawling in accordance with their usual rules, under the direction of their admiral, and in obedience to the signals given by the conventional rockets. Judging from the communications received by wireless telegraphy, the divisions that preceded that of Admiral Rojdestvensky across these waters had signaled nothing unusual. It became known afterward, in particular, that Admiral Folkersam, having been led to pass round the fishing fleet on the north, threw his electric searchlight on the nearest trawlers at close quarters, and, having seen them to be harm-less vessels, quietly continued his voyage.

A short time afterwards the last division of the squadron, led by the Souvoroff' flying Admiral Rojdestvensky's flag, arrived near the spot where the trawlers were fishing. The direction in which this division was sailing led it nearly toward the main body of the fleet of trawlers, round which and to the south of which it would therefore be obliged to sail, when the attention of the officers of the watch on the bridges of the Souvoroff' was attracted by a green rocket, which put them on their guard. This rocket, sent up by the admiral of the fishing fleet, in fact indicated, according to regulation, that the trawlers were to trawl on the starboard tack. Almost immediately after this first alarm, and as shown by the evidence, the lookout men, who, from the bridges of the Souvoroff', were scanning the horizon with their night glasses, discovered on the crest of the waves on the starboard bow, at an approximate distance of eighteen to twenty cables, a vessel which aroused their suspicions because they saw no light, and because she appeared to be bearing down upon them. When the suspicious-looking vessel was shown up by the search-light, the lookout men thought they recognized a torpedo boat proceeding at great speed. Admiral Rojdestvensky therefore ordered fire to be opened on this unknown vessel. The majority of the Commissioners shared the view that the responsibility for this action and the results of the fire to which the fishing fleet was exposed were to be attributed to Admiral Rojdestvensky.

Almost immediately after fire was opened to starboard, the Souvoroff' caught sight of a little boat on her bow barring the way, and was obliged to turn sharply to the left to avoid running it down. This boat, however, on being lit up by the searchlight, was seen to be a trawler. The admiral signaled the squadron not to fire on the trawlers. But according to witnesses testimony, at the same time that the searchlight lit up this fishing vessel, the lookout men on board the Souvoroff' perceived to port another suspicious vessel. Fire was immediately opened on this second vessel, and was therefore being kept up on both sides of the ship.

According to the standing orders of the fleet, the Admiral indicated the objects to be fired at by throwing his searchlight upon them; but as each vessel swept the horizon in every direction with her own searchlights to avoid being taken by surprise, it was difficult to prevent confusion. The fire, which lasted from ten to twelve minutes, caused great loss to the trawlers. Two men were killed and six others wounded; the Crane sank; the Snipe, the Mino, the Moulmein, the Gull, and the Majestic were damaged. The cruiser Aurora was hit by several shots.

The majority of the Commissioners observed that they lacked sufficiently precise details to determine what objects the vessels had fired on; but they recognized unanimously that the vessels of the fishing fleet had not committed any hostile act. The majority of the Commissioners being of the opinion that there were no torpedo boats either among the trawlers nor anywhere near, the Commission concluded that the opening of the fire by Admiral Rojdestvensky had been unjustified The Russian Commissioner, who did not share this opinion, expressed the conviction that the firing had been provoked by the suspicious-looking vessels approaching the squadron with hostile intent.

The fact that the Aurora was hit by several 47-millimeter and 75-millimeter shells could lead to the supposition that this cruiser, and perhaps other Russian vessels left behind on the route followed by the Souvoroff', might in fact have been the object of the first few shots. This mistake might have arisen because this vessel, seen from astern, was apparently showing no light, causing a nocturnal optical illusion that deceived the lookout on the flagship.

The Commissioners found that they did not have sufficient information to enable them to determine the reasons why the fire on the port side had continued. They conjectured that certain distant trawlers might have been mistaken for the original objectives, and were thus fired upon directly. Others, on the contrary, might have been struck by fire directed against more distant objectives. These considerations were not in contradiction with the impressions formed by certain of the trawlers, which, finding that they had been struck by projectiles and remained under the rays of the searchlights, might have believed that they were the object of direct fire.

Case information